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INSURANCE-PROVISION AGAINST EN-
CUMBRANCE OF INSURED PROPERTY-
WAIVER--AGENCY*
Sun Insurance Office v. Scott, Adv. Op. 55;
52 Supreme Ct. 72.
PROVISION in a fire insurance policy rendering the
policy void in case the subject of the insurance be or
become encumbered by a chattel mortgage is valid as
a provision to reduce moral hazard.
A loss payable clause, attached to the policy by a local
agent of the insurer, which merely states that any loss proved
under the policy shall be payable to the assured and to a cer-
tain bank, which in fact held a chattel mortgage on the insured
property, does not operate as a consent to the chattel mortgage
or as a waiver of the provision against encumbrances.
In the absence of a statute otherwise providing, knowl-
edge on the part of the local agent that the property insured
was subject to a chattel mortgage will not be imputed to the
insurance company to effect a waiver of the provision referred
to, or a consent to the mortgage, when the policy expressly
provided that no agent had power to waive any provision or
condition of the policy unless the waiver be written upon or
attached to the policy.
This opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Roberts, disposed
of an appeal from three judgments rendered in actions on
three fire insurance policies. The judgments under review
were for the respondent who was the owner of certain wool
which the petitioning companies had insured. The policies
contained the following provision rendering them void if the
property insured should be encumbered:
"This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement endorsed
hereon or added hereto, shall be void. . . . if the interest of the insured be
other than unconditional and sole ownership; or if the subject of insurance be
*. . personal property and be or become incumbered by a chattel mortgage."
*Dicta calls attention to this case as one causing much comment and controversy
among lawyers.
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The wool insured was subject to a chattel mortgage exe-
cuted prior to the date of one of the policies, and subsequent
to the date of the other two. Riders were attached to the poli-
cies by local agents of the insurance companies reading as fol-
lows:
"Any loss under this policy that may be proved due the assured shall
be payable to the assured and Cumberland Savings Bank Co., Cumberland,
Ohio, subject, nevertheless, to all the terms and conditions of the policy."
The insurance companies set up a defense based on vio-
lation of the chattel mortgage clause. To this defense the
respondent answered that the loss payable clause, as a matter
of law, constituted a waiver of that clause; and that by custom
in the community the loss payable clause was understood and
used to give the insurer's consent to the chattel mortgage. He
also in answer relied upon provisions of §9586 of the Ohio
General Code. Under that section a person who solicits insur-
ance and procures an application therefor is the agent for the
company which thereafter issues the insurance. This agency,
the respondent urged, had the effect of imputing to the com-
pany the knowledge of the existence of the chattel mortgage
which the agent had.
The insurance companies denied the alleged custom, and
set up a provision of each policy to the effect that no agent
had power to waive any provision of the policy except such
as by the terms of the policy might be subject to agreement
endorsed on the policy, and which should be, in fact, endorsed
on the policy.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the
mortgage might be valid as between the respondent and the
mortgagee, it would be sufficient to avoid the policies except
for the loss payable clause. This it thought by its own force
or by customary use constituted a waiver of the clause and a
consent to the chattel mortgage. On certiorari this was re-
versed by the Supreme Court, which held that the loss payable
clause did not constitute a waiver of the chattel mortgage
provision.
We are of opinion that upon the uncontradicted facts the petitioners
made out a valid defense to the suits and were entitled to directed verdicts in
their favor. The provision in the policies prohibiting chattel mortgages with-
out consent endorsed on the policy is intended to reduce the moral hazard, and
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is a valid stipulation, the violation of which constitutes a complete defense
. . .The loss payable clause above quoted is not informative to the insurer
of the existence of a chattel mortgage, but performs the office of protecting a
creditor of the insured who has no interest in the insured property by mortgage
or otherwise against the eventuality of fire loss.
In Bates v. Equitable Insurance Co., 10 Wall. 33, a policy contained a
covenant that if the property were sold the insurance should cease unless con-
sent of the insurer to the sale were given in writing. The policy was endorsed,
"payable, in case of loss, to E. C. Bates," to whom it appeared the insured
goods had been sold. There was no evidence except the endorsement of any
consent to accept Bates, the purchaser, as the party whose interest was insured.
It was said of the practice of making such loss payable endorsements:
"It is a mode of appointing that the loss of the party insured shall be
paid by the company to such third person. This transaction is a very common
mode of furnishing a species of security by a debtor to his creditor, who may
be willing to trust to the debtor's honesty, his skill and success in trade, but
who requires indemnity against such accidents as loss by fire, or the perils
of navigation ...
"In the face of this frequent use of the two indorsements on the policy,
it cannot be held that they imply of themselves a knowledge of the sale or a
consent to insure the purchaser."
We are of opinion that the doctrine announced in the Bates case is con-
trolling here; that the attachment of a loss payable clause is entirely consistent
with the condition against change of interest, or encumbrance of the insured
property, and does not constitute a waiver of the condition against sale or
mortgaging, or a consent thereto.
No sufficient evidence was found in the record to estab-
lish the customary use of the loss payable clause as a consent
to the chattel mortgage.
As to the effect of the Ohio statute constituting the solici-
tor an agent of the insurer, the Court found nothing in it or
in the State decisions construing it to impute to the company
all knowledge which the agent had touching the contract.
We have examined the authorities cited and fail to find that they give
it any such force or effect. They do not, as respondent claims, define the scope
of the agency created by the statute, but leave it to be defined by applicable
principles of common law. In the present cases the policy limits its scope, and
we think the written contract must control.
The case was argued by Mr. Rolland M. Edmonds for
the petitioners, and by Mr. F. S. Monnett for the respondent.
